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Summary 
 
 
This thesis aims to identify the significant stages of the interpretation of the 
concept of dominance under Article 102 TFEU and it attempts to allocate the issues 
concerning the pharmaceutical sector into this process. The launch of the 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry and the Commission’s (and subsequently the EU 
courts) decision in the proceedings against AstraZeneca highlighted the issues 
permeate this sector of the EU economy from competition law perspective. 
After the millennium detrimental transition became noticeable in the 
pharmaceutical industry. As a response the Commission initiated a sector inquiry to 
unearth the reasons of this phenomenon and to address the issues found. Its 
willingness to address the problems arisen is manifest from its treatment of the 
AstraZeneca case. Before this case it was uncertain whether the peculiar 
characteristics of this sector (regulated price, irregular relationship between products 
and their final consumers) should influence the well-established methods applied in 
the assessment of dominance. Apparently, the EU competition authorities concluded 
they do not. AstraZeneca argued that the Commission had failed to attribute due 
significance to these special characteristics when it defined the relevant market. First 
and foremost, the establishment of the relevant product market was challenged by 
AstraZeneca, claiming that the regular price and demand based test should not be 
applicable. Although, the existence of these particular attributes referred by 
AstraZeneca in the initial procedure and in its appeals were acknowledged, 
nevertheless, they failed to convince either the Commission or any of the EU courts to 
accept them as a justification to alter the common approach in the determination of 
the relevant product market. This approach has engendered lively criticism and loud 
concerns among both scholars and practitioners. 
In the conclusion this thesis concludes – in unison with the most frequent critics - 
that reluctance to take substantial discrepancies into account is liable to transmit a 
negative message towards undertakings operating in this sector, since it possibly 
promotes the finding of too narrow market definitions, which easily could have 
discouraging effect on their willingness to invest into now innovative products. 
However, as it is elaborated in the conclusion, the conservatism of the Commission 
and the EU Courts is also understandable bearing in mind the significance of this 
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sector and the importance of sustaining effective enforcement of EU Competition 
Law.  
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EU courts Court of Justice of the European Union 
AG Advocat General 
Commission     European Commission 
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1. Introduction 
 
The concept of dominance under Article 102 TFEU, as it will be presented in this 
paper, has been a controversial topic since its introduction. The interpretation of the 
concept itself and its crucial elements have been subject to intense dispute. The 
reasons are wide-ranged. Initially, even the underpinning notion and purpose of EU 
Competition Law itself was not requisitely configured, let alone these particular 
aspects of Article 102 TFEU. Subsequently, as the fundamental principles were 
gradually elucidated, albeit with some delay1, the equivocal nature of the enforcement 
of Article 102 TFEU was reduced, which affected positively the interpretation of the 
concept of dominance. As a part of this process, throughout the history of its 
application several attempts have been made by the Commission and the EU courts to 
eliminate the ambiguity surrounding it. How successful these efforts have been is not 
an easy question to answer. 
As an addition to the abovementioned in the beginning of the 2000’s a new issue 
emerged owing to the negative processes begun to prevail in the pharmaceutical 
industry. A tendency of reduction in the volume of new medicines occurred along 
with seemingly frequent delay of entry of generic medicines.2 These symptoms led to 
the strong presumption that competition may have not functioned optimally in this 
sector.3 As this industry is crucial to the economy of both the EU as a whole and its 
Member States, on account of, inter alia, financial and employment reasons4, to 
address this issue the Commission launched a sector inquiry in order to examine 
whether agreements between pharmaceutical companies, such as settlements in patent 
disputes, have blocked or lead to delays in market entry. It also looked into whether 
companies may have created artificial barriers to entry/expand through the misuse of 
patent rights, vexatious litigation or other means.5 
The sector inquiry complemented with the intense debate – generated by the 
controversial decisions of the Commission and EU courts in AstraZeneca case - 
formed around whether industry specific characteristics should be taken into account 
                                                
1 The reasons of this are discussed in sub-chapter 3.3. 
2 The emergence of generic substitutions can be regarded as one of the possible causes of this 
2 The emergence of generic substitutions can be regarded as one of the possible causes of this 
phenomenon. This particular issue will be discussed in details in sub-chapter 3.4.3. 
3 Antitrust - sector inquiry into pharmaceuticals – frequently asked questions; 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-20_en.htm?locale=en 
4 These will be discussed in more details in sub-chapters 2.1 and 2.3. 
5 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/ 
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in the assessment of dominance, have directed more attention to the issues the concept 
of dominance has, when the pharmaceutical industry concerns. 
 
1.1 Purpose 
 
On account of the aforementioned the purpose of the thesis is to detect the 
important stages of the evolution of the concept of dominance and to examine 
whether its interpretation has become more transparent. Additionally, it discusses 
whether the current state of interpretation is rightly applicable without any 
amendments in cases in the context of the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
1.2 Method 
 
This research is conducted according to the traditional legal dogmatic method. 
Descriptive and analytical technique will be employed to identify and describe the 
important steps in the evolution of the concept of dominance and ultimately to 
introduce its current state. The purpose of the thesis shall be achieved through 
introduction and examination of relevant case law (decisions from both the 
Commission and the EU courts supplemented with opinions of AGs where 
applicable), related studies, articles and books accessible on the internet or by the 
courtesy of Lund University Libraries. The thesis will follow the accepted legal 
method of examination of dominance (in connection with exclusionary abuses) 
introduced by the Commission’s Guidance Paper about its enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 102 TFEU. Throughout the research references will be made to 
relevant cases to the pharmaceutical sector and each steps of establishing dominance 
will be considered with focus on peculiar features of this industry. 
Besides the aforementioned, economic perspective will be utilised to a limited 
extent to highlight the problematic nature of some element of the concept of 
dominance from an economic point of view. 
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1.3 Limitations 
 
In order to avoid misunderstandings throughout this paper and to allocate it 
between the appropriate frames the following limitations should be made. 
It is presumed that the reader possesses prior knowledge as to the foundations of 
EU Competition Law, thus the historical and theoretical background of Article 102 
TFEU will not be elaborated any further than it is in sub-chapters 3.1 and 3.3, unless 
examination regarding the evolution of the concept of dominance requires otherwise. 
Scope of the thesis is confined to dominance held by individual undertakings and 
only regards to exclusionary abuses. Therefore collective dominance, special 
characteristics of the definition of dominance concerning exploitative and 
reprisal/discriminatory abuses are not subject of it. 
The concept and different forms of abuse will not be discussed either. However, 
since the theory of dominance and abuse are interrelated, references to abuse possibly 
will be made, but only to the extent the particular circumstances require. 
Finally, as regards to the pharmaceutical industry, differentiation between the 
market of prescription medicines and non-prescription (over-the-counter) medicines, 
by virtue of their different nature, is made where the discussed matter requires. As 
opposed to the fact that most cases involved in the context of this sector concern 
parallel trade, the examination of this particular issue is not subject to this research. 
 
1.4 Organisation of the Paper 
 
The thesis is divided to four main chapters. 
The first chapter is intended to present the purpose of this thesis and to give an 
explanation why this is an issue. 
Then, in the second chapter a brief introduction of the pharmaceutical industry, its 
special characteristics and its role in the economy of the European Union is presented. 
The third chapter at the beginning provides a general introduction to Article 102 
TFEU. It consists a short explanation of how its underlying notion evolved and how 
alterations regarding the objectives of EU Competition Law influenced its 
interpretation. Then, the Article itself is presented complemented with some 
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clarifications. Subsequently, the concept of dominance will be examined. It will be 
executed with a focus on the relevant decisions delivered by the Commission and the 
EU courts. The structure if this chapter follows the benchmarks set out by the 
Commission in its Guidance Paper. After a rather general discussion of each point 
issues relevant to the pharmaceutical industry is examined with critical remarks on the 
aspects, which were ignored (by the Court or the Commission) or could have been – 
and should have been – assessed differently. 
Ultimately, concluding thoughts are made to present the conclusions have been 
drawn by the author in connection with the purpose of the thesis. 
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2. The Pharmaceutical Industry and the environment where 
it operates and competes 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Pharmaceutical industry has always been regarded as one of the most important 
sectors globally and in Europe too. It is not surprising given the highly sensitive area 
it encompasses. The protection of human life and health is the first priority of every 
regime (or at least it is supposed to be) and a fundamental value of today’s 
widespread democratic system6. 
Naturally, it is not different in the EU. The moral and economic significance of this 
industry has been acknowledged many times. Neelie Kroes stated in her introductory 
remarks regarding the opening of a competition law sector inquiry into the 
pharmaceutical sector in Europe in 2008: 
 
“The pharmaceuticals sector is vital to the health of Europe's citizens. As well 
as being a vital sector of the economy, medicines are a major expense. 
Medicines cost us all a lot of money– we spend around 200 billion euros each 
year on pharmaceuticals; that's around 400 euros for every man, woman and 
child in the 27 Member States of the European Union. .”7 
 
Relevant statistics also prove this sector’s significance for the EU. According to 
Commission Staff Working Document8 “the EU pharmaceutical sector produced an 
output of € 220 billion and employed approximately 800,000 people in 2012. It 
accounts for around 1.8% of the total manufacturing workforce and is one of the 
industries with the highest labour productivity”9. In 2011, after the United States, the 
                                                
6 Alfonso Gambardella, Luigi Orsenigo, Fabio Pammoli: Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals, 
A European Perspective, November 2000; Report prepared for the Enterprise Directorate General of 
the European Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/files/pharmacos/docs/doc2000/nov/comprep_nov2000_en.pdf 
7 Neelie Kroes (European Commissioner for Competition Policy), Commission launches sector inquiry 
into pharmaceuticals; Introductory remarks at press conference (Brussels, 16th January 2008); 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08-18_en.htm?locale=en 
8 Commission Staff Working Document; Pharmaceutical Industry: A Strategic Sector for The European 
Economy, Brussels, 1.8.2014; [cited: Pharmaceutical Industry: A Strategic Sector] 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/files/docs/pharmastrategy_en.pdf 
9 Pharmaceutical Industry: A Strategic Sector p. 2. 
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European market produced the highest sales figures (26,81% of the total sales of the 
World) in the World.10 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to serve as an overview of the 
pharmaceutical industry, to introduce its characteristics making it unique and needful 
to be examined with closer scrutiny. 
 
2.2 Pharmaceutical undertakings 
 
In the Pharmaceutical Industry Profile issued by the International Trade 
Administration in 2010 the pharmaceutical industry was defined as: 
 
“… companies engaged in researching, developing, manufacturing, and marketing 
drugs and biologicals for human or veterinary use…”11. 
 
Interpretation of the term of drugs and biological products – or with other words 
medicinal products – under EU law is provided by Directive 2001/83/EC12 in terms of 
human and by Directive 2001/82/EC13 as regards to veterinary use. For the purpose of 
this thesis only the previous will be dealt with. Article 1 (2) of the Directive states: 
 
“Any substance or combination of substances presented for treating or preventing 
disease in human beings. 
Any substance or combination of substances which may be administered to human 
beings with a view to making a medical diagnosis or to restoring, correcting or 
modifying physiological functions in human beings is likewise considered a medicinal 
product.” 
 
                                                
10 EFPIA Did you know? The facts and figures; 
http://www.efpia.eu/index.php?mact=FactsFigures,cntnt01,default,0&cntnt01limit=6&cntnt01orderby
=category%20ASC&cntnt01page=3&cntnt01returnid=23&cntnt01returnid=23 
11  Pharmaceutical Industry Profile, International Trade Association, 2010; 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/health/PharmaceuticalIndustryProfile2010.pdf 
12 Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use; Journal officiel des Communautés 
européennes, L 311, 28 novembre 2001; http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32001L0083&from=EN; [cited: Directive 2001/83/EC] 
13 Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the 
Community code relating to veterinary medicinal products; Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L 311, 28 November 2001;  
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Therefore, an undertaking can be considered to be a participant in the 
pharmaceutical industry, if researching, developing, manufacturing or marketing of 
medicinal products - cumulatively or individually – is encompassed by its profile. 
For the sake of clarity, further classification of these undertakings needs to be 
made. Traditionally, on the supply side, two types are differentiated: originator and 
generic companies. Originator companies “…undertake research into new 
pharmaceuticals, develop them from the laboratory to marketing authorisation and 
sell them on the market”14. Generic companies “…use a business model aimed at the 
development of a medicine which is identical or equivalent to originator products…” 
and “…market their products as soon as the originator product encounters loss of 
exclusivity, and their products are sold at a much lower price than the original 
product”15. The document cited before also mentions biotechnology companies.16 
Generally, these are smaller companies with limited resources concentrating on R&D, 
which often patent their invention to larger companies to obtain necessary resources 
in order to utilise their invention.17 
 
2.3 Pharmaceutical market 
 
Globally the structure of the market is concentrated and characterised by a few 
number of huge corporations combined with larger number of smaller companies, 
whose target their products to niche markets.18 
The concentration of the market is noticeable in Europe as well, as the following 
example clearly presents: a relatively small group of big companies were accounted 
for more than 80% of annual turnover of the pharmaceutical industry in Europe in 
2006.19 
                                                
14  ECORYS Research and Consulting: Competitiveness of the EU Market and Industry for 
Pharmaceuticals, Volume II: Markets, Innovation & Regulation, Final report (Rotterdam, December 
2009) p. 12; [cited: ECORYS Research] 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare/files/docs/vol_2_markets_innovation_regulation_en.pd
f 
15 ECORYS Research, p. 12 
16 ECORYS Research, p. 81 
17 Bengt Domeij, Pharmaceutical Patents in Europe, Norstedts Juridik AB, Stockholm, 2000; p. 206; 
[cited: Bengt Domeij (2000)] 
18 Stuart Anderson, Reinhard Huss, Rob Summers, Karin Wiedenmayer: Managing Pharmaceuticals in 
International Health; Springer Basel AG (2004) 
19 ECORYS Research, p. 13 
 14 
As regards to the type of markets where certain medicinal products are marketed 
two can be distinguished: market for prescription and non-prescription medicines.20 
An important distinctiveness of the pharmaceutical market lies in its highly 
regulated nature. Regularly states prefer to set the rules by themselves in relation this 
area and are reluctant to give up their national regime for common legislation. The 
sensitive nature of this industry is two-sided. First of all, it concerns the well-being of 
their citizens and in an ideal world it is itself would be enough reason to handle it with 
more care. However, the other side may be more influential. The social welfare 
system requires the state to ensure the medical treatment for their citizens. Provision 
of medicines is encompassed to some extent everywhere. Corollary, the assurance of 
the availability of these services represents a considerable part of national budgets. 
Therefore, states tend to intervene to set or affect the maximum prices of 
pharmaceutical products under the flag of safeguarding the budget of the social health 
insurance funds.21 The reason for varying prices in different Member States is the 
difference between the methods and degree of intervention.22 Hence, understandably 
states are reluctant to relinquish their own regulations and accept common legislation. 
This preference is reflected in the pertinent EU legislation too. Member States are 
obliged to act according to the so-called Transparency Directive23, otherwise EU law 
has left their respective legislations relatively intact. 
 
2.4 Special characteristics of the sector 
 
The pharmaceutical sector admittedly holds special attributes, which clearly 
distinguish it from other industries. Two main differences were identified by Andrea 
Coscelli, Alan Overd (as far as prescription medicines concern): 
 
• the price of patented drugs is apt to be regulated and 
                                                
20 SWITCH Prescription to nonprescription medicines switch, World Self-Medication Industry 
(WSMI) (2009); http://www.wsmi.org/wp-content/data/pdf/wsmi_switchbrochure.pdf 
21 Lazaros G. Grigoriadis: The Application of EU Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector: The 
Case of Parallel Trade; (2014) 25, European Business Law Review, Issue 1, pp. 141-201; [cited: 
Lazaros G. Grigoriadis (2014)] 
22 Lazaros G. Grigoriadis (2014) 
23 Council Directive 89/105/EEC, of 21 December 1988, relating to the transparency of measures 
regulating the pricing of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion within the scope of 
national health insurance systems; Official Journal L 40, 11/2/1989 p. 8 - 11 
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• usually the ultimate consumer (patient), the decision maker (doctor) and the 
payer (national insurance system) differ.24 
 
On account of the first point between pharmaceutical products the primary mean of 
competition is not their price.25 Rather it concentrates on other means such as R&D 
marketing etc. As a result of the high significance of R&D, patents, by virtue of the 
exclusivity they grant, are extremely valuable assets for companies and are capable of 
conferring significant market power on their holders. 
As regards to the second point, two main aspects ensue this characteristic. Firstly, 
the phenomenon called ‘inertia’. It stands for the prescribing doctors preference to 
prescribe drugs they have already tried and their efficacy is proven.26 This aspect can 
be interesting when new products (or secondary products) entering the market and the 
assessment of competition constraints is taken place. Secondly, since it is not the final 
consumer who pays the price of prescribed medicinal products (it is entirely or 
partially funded by national insurance systems), their sensitivity to price changes is 
relatively low, which should reduces further the role of price in competition 
assessment.27 
 
2.5 The Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry 
 
In addition to the aforementioned in relation to the Sector Inquiry, the Final 
Report28 was published in 2009. It revealed several conducts – not in the context of 
the whole pharmaceutical market, only two of its sectors: “the interface between 
proprietary products and generic products” and “the interaction between 
manufacturers of proprietary medicines” 29  – which can be questionable from 
                                                
24 Andrea Coscelli and Alan Overd: Market definiton in the pharmaceutical sector; Sweet & Maxwell 
and its Contributors (2015); E.C.L.R. 2007, 28(5), 294-296; [cited: Andrea Coscelli and Alan Overd 
(2007)] 
25 Andrea Coscelli and Alan Overd (2007) 
26 Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v European Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2010:266; para. 41.; [cited: AstraZeneca, General Court’s decision] 
27 Case COMP/A. 37.507/F3 - AstraZeneca, recital (115); [cited: AstraZeneca, Commission’s 
Decision] 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=1,2,3&c
ase_title=Astra%20Zeneca 
28 Commission Staff Working Document adopted on 8 July 2009 
29 Josef Drexl, Nari Lee: Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition and Patent Law; Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited (2013); page 242 
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competition law’s point of view. These conducts concern strategic patenting practices. 
In the context of competition between originator and generic companies the Final 
Report expressed two main concerns regarding strategic patenting: firstly, filing of 
numerous patent applications concerning the same product in order to create patent 
clusters, thereby rendering more difficult or impossible the entry of generic products; 
secondly, voluntary “divisional patent” applications filed by originator companies in 
order to extend the respective patent office’s examination period, thereby forcing 
generic companies to face with even more uncertainty.30   
                                                
30 Communication from the Commission - Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry 
Report, point 3.2.1.; 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/communication_en.pdf 
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3. The Concept of Dominance 
 
As it was mentioned before, that the interpretation of the concept of dominance 
generated vigorous debates. Since the first interpretation of its elements it has been 
subjected to endless criticism, and despite the efforts of EU competition authorities it 
is still not a peaceful are of EU Competition Law. For the better understanding of 
reasons behind this may be beneficial to begin with a brief explanation of the 
background of Article 102 TFEU. 
 
3.1 Underlying notion of Article 102 TFEU 
 
The prohibition of abuse of dominant position was introduced in the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (Article 86)31. Since then it has not 
been significantly rephrased, the numbering has been changed twice though. First by 
the renumbering made by the Treaty of Amsterdam32, which altered it to Article 82, 
secondly (and lastly so far) the Treaty of Lisbon33 altered it to be Article 102. 
The purpose of this provision, according to the Court of Justice, was ascertained in 
the cases of Hoffman La-Roche 34  and Continental can 35  (in the 38th and 23th 
paragraphs of the decisions respectively). It was stated that Article 82 "is an 
application of the general objective of the activities of the Community laid down by 
Article 3(l) of the Treaty, namely the institution of a system insuring that competition 
in the common market is not distorted". Although, Article 3(1)(g) of the EC Treaty 
has been omitted from the body of both the TEU and TFEU 36 , the Court’s 
interpretation of competition rules makes it impossible to ignore this provision where 
                                                
31 Treaties of Rome (entered into force: 1 January 1958): Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community; 
32 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts; 97/C 340/01, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, C 340, 10 November 1997 
33 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon; 2007/C 306/01, Official Journal of the European Union, C 306, 17 
December 2007 
34 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities; 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:36 [cited: Hoffman-La Roche case] 
35 Case 6-72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission of the 
European Communities; ECLI:EU:C:1973:22 [cited: Continental Can case] 
36 Now its content is in Protocol No. 27 on the Internal Market and Competition 
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such rules are examined.37 This was reinforced in its decision in TeliaSonera38. As a 
great body of case law showed, system of undistorted competition should be 
interpreted in the light of the principle of competition on the merits.39 
The achievement of an integrated internal market as an objective has been 
reiterated in the case law40 and emphasised by the Commission in the Guidance Paper 
on Article 102 in paragraph 7: 
 
“Conduct which is directly exploitative of consumers, for example charging 
excessively high prices or certain behaviour that undermines the efforts to achieve 
an integrated internal market, is also liable to infringe Article 82…” 
 
The emergence of economic (effect-based) approach in the interpretation of Article 
102 TFEU added a new aspect to the debates surrounding the objective issue. As an 
implication of the Commission’s endeavor to modernise41 the competition policy of 
the EU, begun from the mid 1990s42, economic efficiency and the enhancement of 
consumer welfare as goals of competition provisions were promoted and made the 
situation even more complicated.  
The Commission made efforts to provide more certainty, but the reluctance of the 
Court of Justice to align with its approach43 did not facilitate its task. The first notable 
attempt was the DG Comp Staff Discussion Paper published in December 2005. In 
paragraph 4 it said: 
 
“With regard to exclusionary abuses the objective of Article 82 is the protection of  
                                                
37 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin; EU Competition Law, Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press 
(2014); [cited: Jones and Sufrin (2014)] 
38 Case C-52/09: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 17 February 2011 (reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the Stockholms tingsrätt — Sweden) — Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera AB, 
para. 20-21.; ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 
39 Thomas Eilmansberger; Dominance – The Lost Child? How effects-based rules could and should 
change dominance analysis; 2 Eur. Competition J. 15 2006 
40 e.g. Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE and Others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE 
Farmakeftikon Proïonton, formerly Glaxowellcome AEVE; ECLI:EU:C:2008:504; [cit: Sot. Lélos kai 
Sia case] 
41  The key element of this modernisation was the increase of the influence of economics on 
competition law. 
42 Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Beatriz Conde Gallego, Stefan Enchelmaier: Abuse of Dominant 
Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms?; Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property, Competition and Tax Law; Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008 
43 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 289 
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competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of 
ensuring an efficient allocation of resource.” 
 
It generated vigorous arguments among competition law practitioners and scholars, 
and the Court did not appeared to be willing to follow this path. The judgments44 
delivered around the publication of the Discussion Paper showed this manifestly by 
sticking to former formalistic approach.45 
Therefore, it is easily noticeable that it was a problematic environment, full of 
controversies, when the Commission adopted its Guidance Paper in 2009. Probably 
for this reason, it stated explicitly that it does not intend to be a statement of law, and 
it does not bind the Court of Justice in any sense.46 It ‘merely’ delineated the 
enforcement priorities of the Commission when it decides to take actions relying on 
Article 102 TFEU. However, it did not abandon the concept of consumer welfare as it 
states in paragraph 5: 
 
“In applying Article 82 to exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, the 
Commission will focus on those types of conduct that are most harmful to 
consumers.” 
 
As far as the concept of dominance under Article 102 TFEU concerns it has been 
interpreted many ways as well since it was introduced in 1957. Transition has been 
inevitable by virtue of the unfinished nature of competition policies at the beginning 
(under the law of the European Community) and the fast-moving/developing 
attributes of the field, competition law is intended to regulate. 
The latter is particularly true for the pharmaceutical industry. Regarding this sector 
the judgments in AstraZeneca arguably had a positive impact47 on the elimination of 
uncertainty by providing a statement of law on the interpretation of certain elements, 
which have to be taken into account during the establishment of dominant position. 
                                                
44 Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101; Case C-95/04 P British 
Airways plc v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:2007:166; Case T-201/04 
Microsoft Corp. v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 
45 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 289 
46 Guidance Paper para. 3 
47 White & Case LLP: AstraZeneca v European Commission: Case C-457/10 P (6 December 2012) 
http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/02ee0444-748c-47a3-b17b-
ddd6dfaa2da8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/d04c5061-b57e-4c7d-b85f-f355999891c1/alert-
astrazeneca-december-2012.pdf 
 20 
However, the EU courts’ (and the Commission’s) evaluation (or, according to some, 
ignorance) of the unique characteristics of this industry generated further arguments 
on this already highly debated battlefield of EU Competition Law. 
 
3.2 The prohibition 
 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible 
with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.”48 
 
Article 102 TFEU prohibits abusive conducts of undertakings, which collectively 
or individually hold dominant position within the internal market or a substantial part 
of it, provided that such conduct(s) potentially effect(s) trade between Member States. 
The prohibition applies if five conditions are met: 
 
• one or more undertakings are concerned, 
• they hold, collectively or individually, dominant position, 
• dominant position must be within the internal market or a substantial part 
of it, 
• their unilateral conduct is an abuse according to EU competition rules, 
                                                
48 2008/C 115/01 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 102 
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• potentially it has an effect on trade between Member States.49 
 
However, Article 102 TFEU only applies to conduct of undertakings, which are 
already in dominant position. Therefore, if an undertaking acquires dominance on a 
certain defined market as a result of the conduct at issue50, or the abusive conduct is 
done by an undertaking not having dominant position (regardless whether it is 
harmful for consumers), Article 102 TFEU will not apply.51 
Moreover, merely holding dominant position on the relevant market is not 
prohibited. Dominant undertakings are allowed to compete on the merits as well as 
non-dominants. However, as they are in possession of presumably substantial market 
power the Court imposed the burden of special responsibility on them in Michelin52 
case. 
 
“A finding that an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a 
recrimination but simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has 
such a position, the undertaking concerned has a special responsibility not to 
allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common 
market.”53 
 
As opposed to the fact that the wording of this article has not been changed 
substantially since it was introduced, the controversy and confusion as to its 
interpretation, especially regarding the concept of dominance and abuse, represents 
accurately the ambiguity and uncertainty around the objectives of EU competition 
law. 
 
3.3 Definition of Dominance 
 
The Guidance Paper set out that Article 102 TFEU only applies if two essential 
conditions are met. First, the undertaking concerns must held dominant position on 
                                                
49 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 271 
50 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 270 
51 Federico Etro & Ioannis Kokkoris (Editors): Competition Law and the Enforcement of Art. 102 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2010); Ioannis Kokkoris: Are we Underenforcing Article 102? (Chapter 11) 
52 Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission of the European 
Communities; ECLI:EU:C:1983:313 [cited: Michelin case] 
53 Michelin case para. 10 
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the relevant market. Secondly, the conduct being investigated has to be regarded 
abusive.54 For the purpose of this thesis the previous will be discussed in details. 
Article 102 does not provide a definition of the concept of dominance. It has been 
formed by the practice of and documents issued by the Commission and relevant case 
law of the Court of Justice.55 
The first known definition of dominance is attributed to Leonardo Lessius56. He 
defined dominance as “the ability of one or few offerers to sell a specific kind of 
goods for a certain price, which is freely chosen and independent from competitors as 
well as buyers”.57,58 
As regards to EU Competition Law, the first attempt of the Court of Justice to 
provide its interpretation of the concept at issue was taken place in Sirena v. Eda59 
case. There the Court Stated that dominance means 
 
“… power to impede the maintenance of effective competition over a considerable 
part of the relevant market, having regard in particular to the existence and 
position of any producers or distributors who may be marketing similar goods or 
goods which may be substituted for them.”60 
 
However, the landmark decision concerning this issue was delivered by the Court 
of Justice in United Brands61 case in 1978. The following was asserted:  
 
“… a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it 
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of its consumers.”62 
 
                                                
54 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker: The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application 
and Measurement, Third Edition; Thomson Reuters (Legal) Limited (2010) [cited: Bishop and Walker 
(2010)] 
55 Ivo Van Bael & Jean-Francois Bellis: Competition Law of the European Community; Fourth 
Edition, Kluiwer Law International, 2005; p. 117; [cited: Van Bael and Bellis (2005)] 
56 Doris Hildebrand: The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules; Third Edition, 
Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, 2009; [cited: Doris Hildebrand (2009)] 
57 Doris Hildebrand (2009); p. 44 
58 The concept is highly reminiscent to the wording of the definition deployed today. 
59 Case 40-70 Sirena S.r.l. v Eda S.r.l. and others; ECLI:EU:C:1971:18; [cited: Sirena v. Eda case] 
60 Sirena v. Eda case, para. 16 
61 Case 27/76 United Brands v. Commission; ECLI:EU:C:1978:22; [cited: United Brands case] 
62 United Brands case, para. 65 
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Thus, according to the ECJ by that time, an undertaking could be considered 
holding dominant position (on the relevant market) insofar as it possessed the 
adequate degree of economic strength to set out its market strategy regardless the 
behaviour of its competitors, customers and consumers, thereby jeopardising the 
maintenance of effective competition. 
Subsequently, the Court reiterated and elaborated this definition to some extent in 
Hoffmann-La Roche.  
 
“The dominant position thus referred to relates to a position of economic strength 
enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of its 
consumers.”63 
 
The focus was placed on dominant undertakings’ capability of exploiting their 
leverage conferred to them by this position by distorting normal conditions of 
competition.64 The Court stated: 
 
“Such a position does not preclude some competition, which it does where there is 
a monopoly or quasi-monopoly, but enables the undertaking which profits by it, if not 
to determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the conditions under which 
that competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long 
as such conduct does not operate to its detriment.”65 
 
The definition presented above has become the backbone of the concept of 
dominance, especially after the delivery of the Guidance paper which embraced it in 
its entirety.66 
One may ask, why it took more than twenty years67 for the competent institutions 
of the European Community to define such a fundamental concept of competition 
law. A reason could be the fact that admittedly at the dawn of enforcement of EU 
                                                
63 Hoffmann-La Roche case para. 38 
64 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 299 
65 Hoffmann-La Roche case para. 39 
66 Guidance Paper para. 10 
67 The origin of Article 102 can be traced back to Treaty of Paris, where Article 66(7) had similar 
wording and it already used the term of dominant position. 
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Competition law most of attention was drawn to Article 85. More precisely, cartels 
enjoyed privileged position and were examined with high scrutiny. Additionally, the 
ambiguity surrounding the expressions such as ‘effective competition’ and behave 
‘independently’ ‘ to an appreciable extent’ hindered the practical application of 
Article 102. 
The latter concepts were vigorously criticised. Their weaknesses were reiterated at 
several occasions by economists. Simon Bishop and Mike Walker argued that the 
Court of Justice attempted to rectify the difficulties brought by the ambiguity of 
concept of dominance by providing an interpretation phrased with other undefined 
concepts. According to them terms such as “effective competition”, “normal 
competition” are also yet to be requisitely defined, hence they are hardly capable of 
elucidate the problematic aspects.68 
Regards to independence, it is established that the degree of independence is 
dependent on the level of competitive constraints exerted on the undertaking 
concerned. Thus, in order to act independently, and as a result to have dominant 
position, it must not face with effective competitive constraints.69 Therefore, a firm is 
considered dominant if it is not subject to effective competitive constraints and 
consequently it possesses significant market power. Following this way of thinking, it 
is asserted by Bishop and Walker that corollary to the abovementioned “the legal 
concept of dominance can be equated with the economic concept of significant market 
power” 70 . 71  However, the criterion of acting independently of consumers and 
competitors entails some issues economically. 
First of all, on a sustainable basis no undertakings can act independently of their 
consumers or customers.72 It is derived from the discipline of the demand curve73. 
Whenever a company, regardless whether it is dominant or not, increases its prices 
reduction in demand will inevitably occur. Consequently, from an economical 
perspective, the concept of acting independently of consumers/customers does not 
                                                
68 Bishop and Walker (2010) p. 227 
69 Doris Hildebrand (2009) p. 311 
70 Bishop and Walker (2010) p. 227 
71 This theory is also acknowledged by the Guidance Paper (para. 10). 
72 Joao Pearce Azevedo and Mike Walker: Dominance: Meaning and Measurement; E.C.L.R. 2002, 
23(7), 363-367; 2015 Sweet & Maxwell and its Contributors [cited: Azevedo and Walker (2002)] 
73 Demand curve: “a graphic representation of the relationship between product price and the quantity 
of the product demanded. It is drawn with price on the vertical axis of the graph and quantity 
demanded on the horizontal axis. With few exceptions, the demand curve is delineated as sloping 
downward from left to right because price and quantity demanded are inversely related.”; 
http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/156920/demand-curve 
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sufficiently express the difference between dominant and non-dominant 
undertakings.74 
It is also contested whether independent behaviour of competitors makes sense 
economically. The answer is not straightforward. Every firm operating on a market 
having more than one actor has to face with a certain degree of competition. 
Therefore, every company – unless it is a true monopolist – is subject to some level of 
competition constraints. Every undertaking raising its prices above the competitive 
level will reach that point eventually when it is not profitable anymore. Thus, bearing 
in mind the latter it can be claimed that independence from competitors - to some 
extent at least – is not possible. However, in the sense that an undertaking concerned 
is capable of raising its prices profitably above the competitive level to some extent, it 
is undoubtedly proven that a dominant undertaking can indeed act independently of 
its competitors to an appreciable extent.75 In other words, if a firm is able to maintain 
its price wherever between the competitive price and the point beyond the increase 
becomes unprofitable, it is unquestionably acting independently of competition 
constraints exerted by its competitors. 
Putting this way, it appears relatively easy to determine whether a firm is 
dominant. Perhaps, between perfect competition circumstances it would be indeed. 
Unfortunately, in fact the situation is more complicated. The core of the problem lies 
at the determination of competitive price. There is broad unity that the level of 
competitive price is virtually impossible to calculate. Regardless undertakings are 
dominant or not, it is a normal competitive behaviour from undertakings to raise their 
prices until the constraints imposed on them by competitors allow and the “demand 
curve bites”76. Thus nobody forms its pricing policy to a definable competitive level, 
they rather adjust it to the behaviour of their competitors.77 Therefore, as identifying 
the competitive price is usually impossible, the assessment of dominance needs to be 
based on other criteria.78 
As Azevedo and Walker pointed out in their cited work, other factors than price 
can be taken into account when assessing independence or dominance in general. 
Dependent on the market at issue the main focus of competition can be in other 
                                                
74 Bishop and Walker (2010) p. 228 
75 Azevedo and Walker (2002) 
76 Azevedo and Walker (2002) 
77 Azevedo and Walker (2002) 
78 Cellophane fallacy is closely related to this issue, however, it will be discussed in details in the 
context of the determination of relevant product market. 
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dimensions such as R&D, quality, service, marketing activity or the combination of 
these.79 A good example is the pharmaceutical industry. Owing to the fact that prices 
are not formulated arbitrary80 by marketer firms instead they are regulated by the 
Member States concerned, the focal point of competition is rather on other aspects. 
For instance, between originator companies decisive emphasis is on their willingness 
to take the risk and invest into R&D. The risk is high, as all these will be worth 
nothing if competitors overtake them in submitting patent applications or entering the 
market in relation to a particular product. Furthermore, effective marketing strategies 
can also be a scene of fierce competition. 
 
3.4 Establishing Dominance 
 
The Guidance Paper sets out the steps the Commission follows during its 
investigation under Article 102 TFEU. The first is the assessment of whether the 
undertaking in question is in dominant position and of the degree of market power it 
has.81 It is established that in order to conduct these assessments the relevant market in 
every single case has to be defined separately. After the relevant market is defined the 
Commission will examine the following factors82: 
• competitive structure of the market, 
• the market positions of the dominant undertaking and its competitors 
(market shares), 
• barriers to expansion and entry, 
• countervailing buyer power. 
 
3.4.1 Market Definition 
 
In order to assess the market power of an undertaking first the market where it 
operates has to be accurately defined. It possesses particular importance in case of 
Article 102 TFEU. To examine whether an undertaking holding a dominant position 
or not – which is the starting point of the competition assessment - it is essential to 
                                                
79 Azevedo and Walker (2002) 
80 Arbitrary must be construed in accordance with the aforementioned about independence.  
81 Guidance Paper para. 9. 
82 Guidance Paper para. 12. 
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define the boundaries between it conducts its business. The necessity of defining the 
relevant market, before the establishment of an infringement of Article 102 TFEU, 
was acknowledged by the Court of Justice in Continental Can 83  and has been 
reinforced in further decisions84. 
The purpose of it is “to identify which products and services are such close 
substitutes for one another that they operate as a competitive constraint on the 
behaviour of the suppliers of those respective products and services”85. The objective 
of market definition is not an end in itself, rather it is a stage of the process of 
assessing market power.86 
Although, the case law of the Court of Justice along with the practice and 
guidelines of the Commission attempted to provide a practically useable method how 
the definition should be formed, it is still not as clear-cut as practitioners and 
businesses may wish it to be. The root of this problem is stemming from the nature of 
market definition. It is not a mechanical process87 where after checking all required 
aspects the result is provided. First of all, it always must be done individually on a 
case-by-case basis. The Commission is not allowed to rely on its previous findings88, 
even if the case at issue concerns a situation or sector it examined shortly before. The 
analysis has to reflect on the circumstances prevailing at the time it is conducted.89 It 
has to be done in the light of all available evidences regarding the structure of the 
market, the behaviour of actors on the market and it presupposes an overall 
understanding of the characteristics of a specific sector.90 
The primary aspect considered, when defining the relevant market is taken place, is 
substitutability. It describes a certain market as a compilation of products and services 
                                                
83 Continental Can para. 32. 
84 e.g. Joined cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89 Società Italiana Vetro SpA, Fabbrica Pisana SpA 
and PPG Vernante Pennitalia SpA v Commission of the European Communities; ECLI:EU:T:1992:38; 
para. 159: “The Court considers, on the contrary, that the appropriate definition of the market in 
question is a necessary precondition of any judgment concerning allegedly anti-competitive 
behavior.”; Case T-29/92 Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de 
Bouwnijverheid and others v Commission of the European Communities; ECLI:EU:T:1995:34;  para. 
74 : “For the purposes of Article 86, the proper definition of the relevant market is a necessary 
precondition for any judgment as to allegedly anti-competitive behaviour…, since, before an abuse of a 
dominant position is ascertained, it is necessary to establish the existence of a dominant position in a 
given market, which presupposes that such a market has already been defined.” 
85 Jones and Sufrin (2014), p. 61 
86 Doris Hildebrand (2009) p. 321 
87 Doris Hildebrand (2009) p. 321 
88 Joined cases T-125/97 and T-127/97 The Coca-Cola Company and Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc. v 
Commission of the European Communities, para. 82.; ECLI:EU:T:2000:84 
89 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 305 
90 Doris Hildebrand (2009) p. 321 
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which are interchangeable with each other but not interchangeable with others. 
Substitution may be a different product or the same product from another 
geographical area.91 This approach resulted the differentiation between the aspects of 
relevant market, namely the relevant product and relevant geographical market. 
The Commission follows this methodology as it is manifestly noticeable from its 
Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market. The Notice utilises a “classical 
‘constraints’ approach”92. According to it the three factors precluding the exercise of 
market power are demand substitutability, supply substitutability and potential 
competition. The first plays the most significant role in the process of defining the 
relevant market, the second is taken into account in limited number of cases and the 
third is relevant at a later stage of the competitive assessment.93 
 
a) Relevant Product Market 
 
The notion of interchangeability permeates the Court of Justice’s definition of 
relevant market. It is detectable in its early case law, such as Continental Can and 
others94. 
 
”…the definition of the relevant market is of essential significance, for the 
possibilities of competition can only be judged in relation to those characteristics 
of the products in question by virtue of which those products are particularly apt to 
satisfy an inelastic need and are only to a limited extent interchangeable with 
other products.” 95 
 
Its view was further elaborated in Michelin where it was stated that two products 
may be deemed to be substitute to each other, even though they are not completely 
                                                
91 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 63 
92 Van Bael and Bellis (2005) p. 134 
93 Van Bael and Bellis (2005) p. 134 
94 E.g. Hoffmann-La Roche case para. 28.: “The concept of the relevant market in fact implies that 
there can be effective competition between the products which from part of it and this presupposes that 
there is a sufficient degree of interchangeability between all the products forming part of the same 
market in so far as a specific use of such products is concerned.” 
95 Continental Can case para. 32. 
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only partially interchangeable.96 The focus is on whether the other product imposes a 
competitive constraint.97 
The Court of Justice examined the “functional interchangeability” of the products 
concerned which means that aspects as characteristics, price and intended use 
constituted the primary determining factors.98  This approach was heavily critisised 
and its weaknesses were highlighted in the United Brands case. 
The main question was whether bananas constituted a separate market compering 
to the fresh fruit market as a whole. During its assessment the Court took into account 
physical characteristics such as “appearance, taste, softness, seedlessness, easy 
handling”99 and relying on these findings, it distinguished old, sick and very young 
people as distinct group of costumers. 
It was argued that the Court failed to requisitely support why it attributed decisive 
significance for these particular characteristics, and additional concerns arose about 
the differentiation of consumer groups without reliance on any evidence of the 
volume of their purchase 100 . Arguably a more appropriate approach may have 
provided the same result, however, such handling of these aspects can easily lead to 
too narrow market definitions generating counterproductive enforcement of 
competition rules.101 
Although, subsequently the Court of Justice delivered several judgments on this 
matter, the uncertainty surrounding it was not reduced considerably.102 On account of 
this the Commission published its Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market. The 
Notice intended to provide comprehensive guidance on how the relevant market is 
supposed to be defined in the light of EU Competition Law and to let the ones 
concerned know the facets taken into account by the Commission. This document 
must be applied without prejudice to the case law of the Court and it ensued the 
                                                
96 Michelin case para. 48. 
97 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 311 
98 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 64 
99 United Brands case para. 31 
100 Doris Hildebrand (2009) p. 325 
101 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 309 
102 See the cases: Hoffmann-La Roche case; Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line 
Reisebüro GmbH v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V., para. 39-40., 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:140; Case C-53/92 P Hilti AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:77; Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European 
Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1996:436 
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established principles of the practice of the Commission and the EU Courts.103 The 
latter is apparent in its definition of the relevant product market: 
 
“A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which 
are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the 
products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use.”104 
 
As far as the pharmaceutical industry is concerned, a seminal decision was 
delivered by the Court of Justice in 2012 dealing with this matter. The AstraZeneca 
case was the first ever abuse-case in the pharmaceutical sector, so that the fact that it 
was eagerly anticipated is understandable.105 The Commission found – later the 
General Court as well as the Court of Justice reconfirmed – that AstraZeneca abused 
its dominant position by making “deliberately misleading representations to patent 
agents, national patent offices and national courts in order to acquire or preserve”106 
extended patent protection and for “selective deregistrations of marketing 
authorisations for Losec capsules”107. 
It was the first case as well where the Commission had to define the relevant 
market in the context of the pharmaceutical sector and as usual its findings and 
arguments underpinning them have not been accepted peacefully. The details of the 
case will be discussed below. 
 
(i) Demand Substitutability 
 
The assessment of demand substitution examines the range of products consumers 
consider to be substitutes.108 From a demand-side perspective factors taken into 
consideration, according to the Notice, are the following109: 
• product characteristics and its intended use110 and 
• price. 
                                                
103 Van Bael and Bellis (2005) p. 133 
104 Notice para. 7. 
105  Matteo Negrinotti: Abuse of regulatory procedures in the intellectual property context: the 
AstraZeneca case: Sweet & Maxwell and its Contributors (2015); E.C.L.R. 2008, 29(8), 446-459; 
106 AstraZeneca, General Court’s decision para. 305. 
107 AstraZeneca, General Court’s decision Section D 
108 Notice para. 15 
109 Van Bael and Bellis (2005) p. 136 
110 Notice para. 36. 
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Product characteristics and intended use 
 
This evidence serves the detection of products, which are similar to each other to 
the extent or the responsiveness of the customers indicates that they are substitutes, 
thus they belong to the same product market.111 The Notice clarifies that findings in 
this relation are not determinative on their own, the examination of them is merely the 
first step of defining the relevant product market and its purpose is “to limit the field 
of investigation of possible substitutes”112. Then, it adds that the reason why solely 
functional interchangeability or similarity in characteristics may not provide requisite 
foundation to define the relevant product market is that “the responsiveness of 
customers to relative price changes may be determined by other considerations as 
well”113.114 
This clarification was needed in the light of the earlier case law. Its possible 
misusage was highlighted in United Brands. Mainly this case and the Commission’s 
and EU courts’ inclination to rely on inadequately substantiated conclusions on this 
matter generated vigorous criticism. 
Although, the Notice intended to resolve this issue and provide an assurance for 
practitioners by clarifying this aspect’s complementary nature in the assessment of 
substitutability in the context of Article 102 TFEU, frequently this is the only tool at 
the Commission’s disposal to conclude an accurate market definition. Owing to the 
problems stem from the phenomenon ‘Cellophane Fallacy’ in relation to the SSNIP 
test, it is often impossible to employ it in cases concerning alleged abuse of dominant 
position.115 
Some commentators suggest that special attributes of the pharmaceutical sector – 
especially those elaborated in sub-chapter 2.4 - require it to be handled differently 
than other industries.  
Jacob Westin distinguished the same characteristics as well when he concluded 
that in this sector – by virtue of these specific aspects – less focus should be on price 
and demand elasticity and more attention should be paid to sector specific criteria 
                                                
111 Van Bael and Bellis (2005) p. 136. 
112 Notice para. 36. 
113 Notice para. 36. 
114 As an example see Michelin case where new and retreated tyres were defined as constituting 
separate markets despite their similar characteristics. 
115 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 73 
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such as products’ therapeutic indications.116 As he states, in order to follow this path 
more reliance on the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) Classification 
System117 may be adequate. ATC is not unknown for the Commission, it employed the 
system as a reference to market definition earlier (in merger cases) and it did too in 
AstraZeneca118. Yet, the Commission decided to follow the traditional method, and in 
its assessment attributed greater importance to the respective characteristics119 and 
mode of action of PPIs and H2 blockers.  
 
“As a result, the PPIs have a mode of action which is fundamentally distinct from 
that of the H2 blockers and - even more so - from those of other categories of 
medicines used within the field of acid-related gastrointestinal diseases or 
conditions.”120 
 
“This direct blocking action which is unique to the PPIs is strongly linked to the 
therapeutic superiority of the PPIs over the H2 blockers and, whilst insufficient by 
itself to determine the market … supports a relevant product market comprising 
only PPIs…”121 
 
Consequently, despite there was manifest overlap122 between the therapeutic use of 
PPIs and H2 blockers – even though PPIs were generally prescribed for more severe 
form of the same medical condition due to its higher efficiency – the Commission 
(and the GC and later the Court of Justice too) ignored this fact and found the way to 
legitimately insist to its established principles. 
                                                
116 Jacob Westin: Defining relevant market in the pharmaceutical sector in the light of the Losec-case – 
just how different is the pharmaceutical market?; Sweet & Maxwell and its Contributors (2015); 
E.C.L.R. 2011, 32(2), 57-62; [cit: Jacob Westin (2011)] 
117 Its purpose: ”The ATC/DDD system classifies therapeutic drugs. The purpose of the ATC/DDD 
system is to serve as a tool for drug utilization research in order to improve quality of drug use.” and 
the classification system is the following: ”In the ATC classification system, the drugs are divided into 
different groups according to the organ or system on which they act and their chemical, 
pharmacological and therapeutic properties. Drugs are classified into five different levels. Drug 
consumption statistics (international and other levels) can be presented for each of these five levels.”; 
http://www.who.int/classifications/atcddd/en/ 
118 AstraZeneca, Commission’s Decision point 371-372, 905. 
119 For the respective mode of action see: AstraZeneca, Commission’s Decision point 373-375. 
120 AstraZeneca, Commission’s Decision point 376. 
121 AstraZeneca, Commission’s Decision point 377. 
122 The overlap is seemed to be proven by the facts that the introduction of PPIs was ensued by gradual 
reduction in the sales of H2 blockers and its manufacturers were compelled to redirect their products to 
milder forms of this particular medical condition. 
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Price 
 
“The exercise of market definition focuses on price for operational and practical 
purposes, and more precisely on demand substitution arising from small, 
permanent changes in relative prices.” 123 
 
The Notices embraced the widely know test of examining demand and supply 
substitutability, the SSNIP124 test, also called the Hypothetical Monopolist test125. The 
purpose of this test is to examine “whether the parties’ customers would switch to 
readily available substitutes or to suppliers located elsewhere in response to a 
hypothetical small (in the range 5% to 10 %) but permanent relative price increase in 
the products and areas being considered. If substitution were enough to make the 
price increase unprofitable because of the resulting loss of sales, additional 
substitutes and areas are included in the relevant market. This would be done until 
the set of products and geographical areas is such that small, permanent increases in 
relative prices would be profitable.”126 
However, whenever this test is applied in the context of Article 102 TFEU the 
phenomenon called ‘Cellophane fallacy’ must be borne in mind. It means that during 
the application of the SSNIP test it cannot be identified undoubtedly whether the 
current price is already manipulated by the purportedly dominant undertaking, thus it 
is always doubtful whether the prevailing price and competitive price coincide.127 This 
doubt derives from the very nature of profit-maximising firms, as they will always 
increase their prices as high as it is profitably possible.128 
This limb of the determination of the degree of demand substitutability is arguably 
problematic in the pharmaceutical sector. As it was mentioned earlier the price of 
certain pharmaceutical products (as far as prescription medicines concerned) are not 
freely determined. This market – as opposed to others – is highly regulated and it 
particularly applies for prices. Furthermore, another peculiarity, namely that 
frequently it is not the final consumer who is the decision maker (rather the 
                                                
123 Notice para. 15. 
124 It stands for ‘Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price’. 
125 Bishop and Walker (2010) 
126 Notice para. 17. 
127 Jones and Sufrin (2014)  p. 71 
128 Bishop and Walker (2011) p. 125 
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prescribing doctor or national healthcare authority who is the payer) in terms of 
medicines, renders the situation even more intricate.129 Corollary, competition in the 
pharmaceutical sector is not based on price. It is rather on non-price means e.g. 
detailing activity to doctors, advertising in medical journals, funding clinical studies, 
etc. 130  Therefore, the conventional application of the SSNIP test easily can be 
misleading in the estimation of demand elasticity131, let alone the difficulties arise 
regarding the determination of competitive price or the prevailing market price. 
In AstraZeneca in its appeal to the General Court, AZ argued that the Commission 
attributed significance to price difference between PPI and H2 blockers to greater 
extent than it would have been appropriate.132 It employed the regulated market 
argument, briefly, that, as a result of the regulated nature of the market, prices are 
determined or influenced by public authorities, competition is based on non-price 
related factors, thus utilising them as determinative factors in assessing the intensity 
of competition between the two products is apt to provide false results.133 The General 
Court dismissed this argument by stating that strength of the position of 
pharmaceutical undertakings have in negotiations with public authorities is highly 
dependent on the features of the particular product e.g. its added therapeutic value, 
cost-effectiveness, prices for the same or similar products on the domestic and foreign 
market, etc., hence the price of a particular product indicates authorities’ perception of 
its therapeutic efficacy compering to other products.134 The significant price difference 
between PPI and H2 blockers – in favour of the preceding – reflects manifestly that 
national authorities attributed considerably higher therapeutic efficacy to PPIs, 
consequently the Commission rightly evaluated this factor as an indication of defining 
two separate markets.135 The GC also affirmed the Commission’s stance, according to 
which despite the specific features characterising the pharmaceutical product market 
(it explicitly refers to prescribing doctors and patients relatively limited sensitivity for 
price changes) “an economic approach based on the observation of the reaction of 
demand to relative price changes”136 is not invalidated. 
                                                
129 Jacob Westin (2011) 
130 Andrea Coscelli and Alan Overd (2007) 
131 Andrea Coscelli and Alan Overd (2007) 
132 AstraZeneca, General Court’s decision para. 112. 
133 AstraZeneca, General Court’s decision para. 112. 
134 Lazaros G. Grigoriadis (2014) 
135 AstraZeneca, General Court’s decision para. 161-165. 
136 AstraZeneca, General Court’s decision para. 91. 
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This statement was not deemed to be erroneous by the Court of Justice either. 
Thus, based on the approach of the Commission and the EU Courts, it has been 
concluded that, albeit the peculiar features of the pharmaceutical sector should not be 
ignored, they do not render the general principle of market definition inapplicable.137 
In effect, in this way the coherence was maintained regarding this matter, as the Court 
did not go against its decision in Sot. Lélos kai Sia, where it did not accept, that the 
specific nature of the pharmaceutical industry justifiably preclude the application of 
the Community’s competition law.138 
 
(ii) Supply substitutability 
 
As it was mentioned earlier this aspect plays lesser role in the process of defining 
the relevant (product) market. 
The Court of Justice ruled in Continental Can, that accurate definition of the 
relevant market requires the examination of substitutability not only from the demand 
side, but the supply side as well.139 Supply substitutability is also defined in the 
Notice:  
 
“… means that suppliers are able to switch production to the relevant products 
and market them in the short term without incurring significant additional costs or 
risk in response to  small and permanent changes in relative prices.”140 
 
This side is only considered if its influence is equivalent to the demand side’s in 
terms of effectiveness and immediacy.141 
In the pharmaceutical industry due to patent protection for new, innovative 
products supply side substitution is more likely to be taken into account in the context 
of competition between generic companies. When they enter the market generally the 
protection assured by respective patents, upon their expiry, is over – apart from 
situations involving patent settlements -, hence it is more conceivable that attempts 
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140 Notice para. 20. 
141 Notice para. 20. 
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are made by these companies to alter their production in order to compete with each 
other.  
 
(iii) Further factors possibly relevant to the pharmaceuticals 
 
Distinct group of customers can be pertinent to the determination of relevant 
product market in this sector. According to the Notice, 
 
“A distinct group of customers for the relevant product may constitute a narrower, 
distinct market when such ha group could be subject to price discrimination”142. 
 
However, it can be relevant to the assessment only it two cumulative conditions are 
met: 
 
“(a) it is possible to identify clearly which group an individual customer belongs 
to at the moment of selling the relevant products to him, and (b) trade among 
customers or arbitrage by third parties should not be feasible.”143 
 
This factor can have particular significance in relation to pharmaceutical products 
as certain medicinal products are aimed to their respective circle of customers. For 
example, pain killers for adults and for children. It is unlikely that an adult’s response 
for a price increase – unless it is unrealistically enormous – would be to buy child 
painkillers for themselves. The same applies for the reverse as nobody in their right 
mind would sedate their child intentionally in order to save money. Accordingly, 
irrespective of the fact that they are both painkillers, it would be incorrect to rule that 
they constitute the same market. 
It is also worth to mention that Andrea Coscelli and Alan Overd in their article 
about market definition in the pharmaceutical market suggested some further aspect 
which should be taken into consideration in the determination of relevant market 
when pharmaceutical sector concerns. They recommended three aspects which should 
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influence the assessment of market definition in order to make the traditional 
approach more sensitive to “the drivers of demand” of the pharmaceutical industry.144 
Firstly, in its essence a similar stance is represented as it was shown above by the 
opinion of Jacob Westin. They support the emergence of therapeutic substitutability 
by taking “information from medical literature, labeling information and expert 
witness statements”145 into account in the assessment of market definition. Perception 
of doctors as regards to the products appropriate to treat the particular conditions 
should be treated as an indication when narrowing of the relevant product market is 
taken place. 
Secondly, prescribing patterns would serve well as indicators as regards to the use 
of medicinal products. If two of them are mainly prescribed as treatment to the same 
or similar symptoms this strongly suggests that those two belong to the same market. 
Thirdly, they support the inclusion of “different competitive factors on sales of a 
specific product” (e.g. detailing and advertising activity, entry of competing products, 
etc.) in the assessment of market definition.146 
All these suggestions sound reasonable, however, it appears neither the GC not the 
Court of Justice embraced them. The decision of the previous in AstraZeneca case 
was delivered on 1 July in 2010, three years after this article had been published. It 
seems for some reason the GC (and subsequently the Court of Justice) was unwilling 
to take these aspects into consideration in a decisive manner.147 
Unfortunately, the Commission’s decision in Servier 148  case is not publicly 
available at the moment, it would be interesting to see whether the Commission 
treated differently the question of relevant product market than it did in AstraZeneca. 
 
b) Relevant geographical market 
 
The meaning of relevant geographical market, under the scope of EU Competition 
Law, was first defined by the Court of Justice in United Brands. The Court stated that 
along with the particular characteristics of the product in question reference has to be 
                                                
144 Andrea Coscelli and Alan Overd (2007) 
145 Andrea Coscelli and Alan Overd (2007) 
146 Andrea Coscelli and Alan Overd (2007) 
147 For instance, indirectly it referred to the ATC, however, its decision was apparently based on other 
considerations. (Jacob Westin 2011) 
148 Case COMP/AT.39612 – Perindopril (Servier) Commission Decision of 9 July 2014 
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made to the geographical area where it is marketed and “where the conditions of 
competition are sufficiently homogenous for the effect of the economic power of the 
undertaking concerned to be able to be evaluated”149. Further, it was added in 
paragraph 44 of the judgment that “this is an area where the objective conditions of 
competition applying to the product in question must be the same for all traders”. 
The Notice, as it could be seen in the context of the relevant product market too, 
aligned its definition with the established principles regarding this matter. Its 
definition virtually combines the two paragraphs cited above: 
 
“The relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which 
the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogenous and which can be 
distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are 
appreciably different in those areas.”150 
 
Article 102 TFEU clearly states that it only applies if dominant position is held 
within at least a substantial part of the internal market. It is established in case law151 
that, albeit the continual enlargement of the EU may be able to change this stance, 
even one single Member State – or only parts of it – can be considered to be a 
substantial part of the internal market.152 This issue is particularly important in the 
context of the pharmaceutical sector. As a consequence of the discrepancy of the 
methods and degrees of state interventions and the relatively low level of Community 
harmonisation in this area, in respective cases the relevant geographical market is 
frequently deemed to be one single Member State. 153 As a matter of fact, the 
Commission in every case concerning pharmaceuticals has defined geographical 
market as a single Member State by this date. Given the causes of this practice it is 
hard to see this changed until further harmonisation is taken place. 
 
                                                
149 United Brands case, para. 11 
150 Notice para. 8. 
151 See: Case 226/84 British Leyland Public Limited Company v Commission of the European 
Communities, para. 3-10., ECLI:EU:C:1986:421; Case 26-75 General Motors Continental NV v 
Commission of the European Communities, para. 9-10., ECLI:EU:C:1975:150 
152 Jones and Sufrin (2014) p. 282 
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3.4.2 The position of undertakings on the relevant market 
 
The first step – after the definition of relevant market - of the assessment of 
dominance in the Guidance Paper is the determination of market position of the 
allegedly dominant undertaking and its competitors.154 The Commission followed the 
footsteps of the Court of Justice, as this has been established in case law since 
Hoffmann-La Roche.155 
For several years competition authorities were heavily criticised for their 
inordinate reliance on market shares in finding dominance. The Court acknowledged 
in Hoffmann-La Roche that there could be other relevant factors as to the finding of 
dominance, albeit it stated that large market shares held for some time is in itself 
indicative of dominance.156 The meaning of large market was clarified in AKZO157 
case, where it was defined as being over 50 percent.158 
However, the Commission in its Guidance Paper asserts explicitly that market 
shares merely “provide a useful indication”.159 Further, it reiterates that market share 
of the allegedly dominant undertaking always has to be assessed in the light of 
relevant market conditions.160,161 For instance barriers to entry needs to be taken into 
account, as if entry to the particular market is costless and relatively easy, it will be 
unlikely even for a monopolist to be capable of increase its prices profitably.162 
Additionally, it sets the threshold of 40 percent or above where dominance is likely to 
occur, but it states that even if an undertaking’s market share is below this level, 
dominance still can be established insofar as “competitors are not in the position to 
constrain effectively the conducts of” the undertaking concerned.163 
Nonetheless, market share still has a significant role in finding dominance as it can 
been seen from AstraZeneca, where both the General Court and the Court of Justice 
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approved AZ’s high market share (held for a long period of time) as a factor 
supporting the Commission’s decision on dominance.164 
 
3.4.3 Barriers to entry/expand 
 
In order to determine market power of a given undertaking the identification of 
factors which can be regarded as barriers to entry or expansion is instrumental.165 
Hence, to define them accurately is crucial. 
This term has been attempted to be defined plenty of times in the academic 
literature on the structure of the market.166 Essentially these definitions can be 
originated from two fundamental approaches. The first definition (created by Joe S. 
Bain, a decorated representative of the Harvard School167) focused on the ability of 
incumbent firms to earn above normal profits without being threatened by the entry of 
competitors168: 
 
“The extent to which, in the long run, established firms can elevate their selling 
prices above the minimal average costs of production and distribution … without 
inducing potential entrants to enter the industry.”169 
 
The other definition was formed by George J. Stigler whose approach concentrated 
on the cost differences must be borne by new entrants but not by incumbents by virtue 
of their already well-established position on the market concerned170: 
 
“a cost of producing … which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter the 
industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry.”171 
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Competition law policy makers preferred Bain’s definition. This is reflected in 
relevant case law172 of the Court of Justice and related documents of the Commission. 
The Commission in both of its Discussion Paper and its Guidance Paper approached 
this aspect from price’s point of view. Both of them emphasise the importance of 
barriers to entry/expansion, as significant market share not necessarily enables the 
undertaking at issue to exert its market power insofar as the potential of entry by 
potential competitors or expansion by existing competitors functioning as a deterrence 
for it to increase its prices. 173 
As far as the different types of barriers to entry concerns an important source is the 
OECD report174 on this matter. It distinguishes two basic and an additional types. It 
also asserts that overlap is possible between the categories and none of them should 
be employed and interpreted in isolation as interrelations may occur.175 According to 
the report there are structural and strategic barriers. Structural barriers derive from 
standard attributes of the given industry (such as cost, demand, technology), and these 
factors are commonly out of the incumbent companies control.176 Strategic barriers 
encompass conditions created intentionally by incumbents – not necessarily but 
occasionally – to deter new entrants.177,178 Additional category is sunk costs. These are 
costs the entrant incurs on the entry of the market, but which cannot be recovered in 
case of exit (e.g. expenses of recruiting and trainings, advertising and promotion 
costs, expenses of complying with government regulations).179 
Neither the Discussion Paper nor the Guidance Paper utilise such sophisticated 
differentiation, albeit they set out the categories in the same notion. As a matter of 
fact the Discussion Paper is more elaborative than the Guidance. However, for the 
purpose of this research the one provided by the Guidance suffice. It provides a non-
exhaustive list of aspects constitute barriers to entry or expansion in paragraph 17: 
 
                                                
172 See cases: United Brands para 122-123; Hoffmann-La Roche para 48; OJ L65/19 (1988) Eurofix-
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173 Discussion Paper para 34.; Guidance Paper point 16. 
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“They may be legal barriers, such as tariffs or quotas, or they may take the form of 
advantages specifically enjoyed by the dominant undertaking, such as economies 
of scale and scope, privileged access to essential inputs or natural resources, 
important technologies … or an established distribution and sales network ... They 
may also include costs and other impediments, for instance resulting from network 
effects, faced by customers in switching to a new supplier. The dominant 
undertaking's own conduct may also create barriers to entry, for example where it 
has made significant investments which entrants or competitors would have to 
match …, or where it has concluded long-term contracts with its customers that 
have appreciable foreclosing effects. Persistently high market shares may be 
indicative of the existence of barriers to entry and expansion.” 
 
Some of these forms have been awarded with special attention due to the 
Commission’s Sector Inquiry in the pharmaceutical sector. Namely, barriers 
constituted by the legal and regulatory environment, especially issues regarding 
intellectual property rights and regulatory procedures.  
 
a) Intellectual property rights and patenting strategies 
 
Intellectual property rights by their very nature are capable of functioning as 
barriers to entry or expansion. Exclusivity granted by them to heir owners is the 
essence of the whole concept. Accordingly, it is established in case law that the mere 
possession of IPRs is not anti-competitive and certainly not a sole indication of 
establishing dominance180 and it cannot be regarded as an abuse181. Nevertheless, their 
significance in competition issues is undoubted. 
It is not different in the pharmaceutical industry, however, some peculiarities 
regarding patents are worth having a closer look. As IPRs in general, the purpose of 
granting patents is also to confer exclusive rights to their holders, which may have 
                                                
180 Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television 
Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities; ECLI:EU:C:1995:98; para. 46 
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undesirable consequences (such as blocking of R&D activities of competitors)182 and 
are capable of constituting barriers for actual or potential competitors. However, the 
abovementioned Sector Inquiry and cases concerning this matter (AstraZeneca, 
Boehringer183) revealed that different strategies of undertakings have to be taken into 
account too.184  
The Sector Inquiry Final Report dealt with two form of strategic patenting, both 
conducted by originator companies: 
 
• filing of patents to extend the exclusivity period of certain patents, thereby 
delaying generic companies’ entry to the market (‘dilatory’ patenting), 
• defensive patenting in order “to impede the innovative effort of competing 
originators”.185 
 
Defensive patents, dependent on their objective, can be defensive blocking patents 
and aggressive blocking patents. The latter’s objective is to restrict the activity of 
competitors, the previous intends to “protect the applicants own innovation”186 and 
“to broaden the applicant’s own field of activity”187. 
An effective mean of defensive patenting is the creation of patent clusters. It is 
realised by filing numerous additional patents for the same medicine188, thereby 
creating a ‘fence’ or protective bastion around the protected active substance. Thus, 
even if the main patent expires the bunch of secondary patents189 surrounding it make 
the situation of competitors (both originators and generics) excessively difficult. 
Therefore these actions can easily be considered strategic barriers to entry/expand, 
nevertheless, they possibly constitutes an abuse for the purpose of Article 102 TFEU. 
Accordingly, these aspects  - it is, however, not easy to detect them – should also 
be taken into consideration in the assessment of existence of different barriers on the 
relevant market. Some of these barriers may only be unearthed when the Commission 
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faces them in an investigation against a particular undertaking, however, complete 
ignorance of them in other cases would increase the possibility of concluding false 
market definitions, hence inducing competition authorities to take unnecessary 
actions. 
Another phenomenon, which is worth mentioning, is the lately emerged practice 
among originator companies, namely the introduction of follow-on products. 
Originator companies, as a response to the popularity of generic substitutions, altered 
their strategies, and instead of concentrating on the discovery of new, innovative 
medicines, their efforts directed to the enhancement of their existing products. As a 
part of this strategy before the expiry of their patents (ergo before the launch of the 
generic version of the original medicine) they engage in excessive marketing 
campaigns to regroup their customers behind the new, allegedly enhanced product.190 
Therefore, even if the first generation patent is expired and generics are allowed to 
enter the market there will be no customers interested in their products.  
Although, the anti-competitive nature of this trend is problematic to prove, it is 
certainly influence generic companies willingness to enter to a particular market. 
 
b) Market Authorization 
 
The GC stated in AstraZeneca, that regulatory procedures cannot be used to 
prevent market entry or make entry more difficult for competitors unless it relates to 
competition on the merits or it is objectively justified.191 
Accordingly, the aspect, which has been highlighted by AstraZeneca and can be 
interesting in relation to identification of barriers, is market authorization. 
It is compulsory to obtain it in order to allocate a new medicine on the market. Its 
particular importance lies in the relationship between originator and generic 
companies. Before the authorization is granted, in case of completely new medicines, 
evidences of safety and efficacy is required to be provided by results of pre-clinical 
tests and clinical trials. However, generic companies are exempted from these 
requirements insofar as their product is considered essentially similar to the reference 
                                                
190 Jacob Westin: Product switching in the pharmaceutical sector - an abuse or legitimate commercial 
consideration?, E.C.L.R. 2011, 32(12), 595-601; 2015 Sweet & Maxwell and its Contributors 
191 AstraZeneca, General Court’s decision para 24. 
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medicinal product (abridged application). 192  At the time AstraZeneca withdrew the 
market authorization of Losec, generic companies could only benefit from the 
abridged procedure if the reference medicine still possessed market authorization193, 
therefore it forced generic companies to conduct the expensive trials if they intended 
to apply for authorization in the respective countries. 
Although, the barrier created by AstraZeneca cannot be reprised owing to the 
amendment of the respective provision of Directive 2001/83, this example clearly 
shows that shortcomings of regulatory systems can indeed hinder firms 
entering/expanding to/on the market, thereby behave as barriers to entry/expansion. 
 
3.4.4 Countervailing buyer power 
 
As the third limb of the assessment of dominance the Commission assesses the 
“constraints imposed by the bargaining strength of the undertaking’s customers”194. It 
asserts later that it is conceivable that competitive constraints may be exerted by 
customers on a given market in addition to or instead of by actual or potential 
competitors.195 Even if an undertaking at issue possesses significant market share, its 
customer or customers, by virtue of their size or their significance for that undertaking 
and by means of their capability of turning to other suppliers swiftly or promoting 
new entry, may function as a deterrence for the undertaking to increase its prices 
profitably.196,197 However, in order to take this aspect into consideration it is not 
sufficient that only a limited number of customers are capable of resisting the market 
power of the allegedly dominant undertaking.198 Therefore, when countervailing buyer 
power is weighed, it needs to be examined whether it protects smaller buyers as 
well.199 
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As regards to the pharmaceutical industry, owing to the Member States’ preference 
to set prices200 – as far as prescription medicines concerns - some may think since 
prices are not freely determined, perhaps competition rules should not apply.201 This 
was argued by the appellant in Sot. Lélos kai Sia case, however, it fell on deaf ears. 
AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer writes in his Opinion202 that “although the pharmaceuticals 
market does not operate under normal competitive conditions, the price regulation 
system is not completely free from the influence of the manufacturers, which negotiate 
prices with the Member State health authorities, enjoy a degree of strength in the 
market …” 203 . Therefore, since undertakings do have some influence on the 
formulation of price, this characteristic does not extract such cases from the scope of 
EU Competition Law. The Court of Justice agreed, so that this argument was swiftly 
dismissed. Moreover, Member States’ price policies are not as rigid as they appear at 
first sight. They are mitigated by the Transparency Directive and for instance by 
particular patent rights held by respective undertakings.204 The Opinion of AG Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer highlighted these aspects. In Article 2 (1) of the Transparency 
Directive it is clearly stated that in price setting procedures the national authority is 
obliged to provide objective and verifiable grounds in case of refusing the marketing 
of a given medicine on the proposed price.205 Article 2 (2) loosens even further the 
process by introducing the principle of ‘administrative silence’ stating that insofar as 
the competent authority fails to issue an official response in ninety days from the 
submission of the application, the applicant is entitled to market the product.206 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this research was to examine and present the evolution of the 
interpretation of dominance under Article 102 TFEU. However, has this concept 
really evolved? As it can be seen from the definition of fundamental elements of it, 
such as dominance itself, relevant product and geographical market, etc., more or less 
they have been embraced by the Commission in the Notice of defining relevant 
market and the Guidance Paper as they were settled in the early case law of the Court 
of Justice without any crucial amendments. Thus, it cannot be stated with confidence 
that the definitions themselves evolved virtually anything since they were provided by 
the Court of Justice in its seminal decisions. 
On the other hand, such statement unquestionably cannot be made as to the 
interpretation of these essential concepts. For instance, as opposed to the initial 
treatment of market share of the Court of Justice, today it is settled that even very 
large market share is not sufficient in itself to support the presumption of dominance. 
It is only indicative along with other equally important factors. The gradual 
infiltration of economic theories to the assessment of competition issues can be held 
responsible for this change of approach and probably it can be considered a step 
forward in the evolution of the concept of dominance after the early years when 
economic analysis were barely employed. 
However, is it enough? The incremental diversification of different fields of the 
industry, which is ultimately the subject of competition law, suggests otherwise. The 
importance of the consideration of sector specific characteristics has been argued by 
scholars and representatives of certain industries. Yet, both the Commission and EU 
Courts appear to be reluctant to take these aspects into account, at least to the extent 
as commentators and undertakings would desire. 
A good example is the pharmaceutical sector and the infamous AstraZeneca case. 
The existence of peculiar attributes of the pharmaceutical industry was not rejected, 
nevertheless, no decisive significance was attributed to them.  The Commission in 
fact considered these aspects, albeit eventually it managed to find the way to insist to 
its well-established principles. The EU Courts subsequently affirmed the findings of 
the Commission and asserted that the existence of special characteristics should be 
taken into consideration in the assessment of dominance, however, without prejudice 
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to the general approach207 utilised in this assessment. Some scholars expressed their 
concerns in connection with this approach. Jacob Westin argues that the current 
approach leads to too narrow market definitions which is detrimental in general but 
even more in connection with innovative products – such as the products of the 
pharmaceutical industry -, as it discourages easily the development of new innovative 
medicines, that, in principle, is everybody’s interest. 208 Thus, it is questionable 
whether narrow market definition is the right tool to the promotion of consumer 
welfare, especially in such an innovation-focused industry as pharmaceuticals.209 
On the other hand, reluctance of competition authorities to yield to these critics is 
also understandable. As pharmaceutical products absorb a substantial part of national 
budgets the sensitivity of the issue is apparent. Furthermore, multinational companies 
operating in the sector possess significant economic power which cannot be ignored 
by the Member States nor the EU as a community. These may explain the careful 
approach adopted by the Commission and EU courts towards the meaningful 
consideration of the aforementioned special characteristics, viz. if they attributed 
decisive significance to these, it would decrease their latitude and the scope of cases 
they would be able to legitimately intervene. The acceptance would ensure better 
possibilities for undertakings to seek immunity from the ambit of Article 102 TFEU 
and the financial strength of them assures that they would certainly find the way to 
exploit this opportunity. 
Therefore, the discovery of balance between the interests of fast-paced, innovation-
focused industries - and arguably consumer welfare as far as pharmaceuticals 
concerns - and the interests of EU Competition Law, then the implementation of a 
mutually acceptable solution to the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU may constitute 
the next step in the evolution of the concept of dominance. Until then, expectedly 
several cases will be referred to EU courts by appellants, challenging the market 
definition and other controversial findings of the competent competition authorities.210 
 
                                                
207 Instead of relying on the ATC code it focused on the generally applicable aspects: product 
characteristics, price and intended use. 
208 Jacob Westin (2011) 
209 Jacob Westin (2011) 
210 It is already happening by a pending case before the GC, Servier challenges the Commission’s 
decision, inter alia, in connection with its market definition.; Announcement from the EU Commission 
– Servier’s response 9.7.2014; 
http://servier.co.uk/content/announcement-eu-commission-%E2%80%93-servier%E2%80%99s-
response-972014 
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